From 68f35011e4145524de7677ad9c693e864a8db14b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Natasha Moongrave Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 17:50:11 +0200 Subject: Added avis in cavea blog post --- src/Pages/blog/posts/2026-04-17-avis-in-cavea.md | 287 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 287 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/Pages/blog/posts/2026-04-17-avis-in-cavea.md diff --git a/src/Pages/blog/posts/2026-04-17-avis-in-cavea.md b/src/Pages/blog/posts/2026-04-17-avis-in-cavea.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd38bc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/Pages/blog/posts/2026-04-17-avis-in-cavea.md @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +# Libertas hominis est sicut libertas avis in cavea + +## Human freedom is like the freedom of a bird in a cage. + +### Natasha Moongrave +### January 2026 + +## 1 Introduction: Avis in cavea + +According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech +Republic, freedom, or rather individual freedoms, is defined as “inalienable, +inalienable, imprescriptible and irrevocable”^2. Freedom is presented here as a +fundamental characteristic of human existence, which belongs to every person +regardless of circumstances. The question is whether it is actually possible to +guarantee freedom through a legal text. +Freedom then becomes a set of defined rights, the boundaries of which are +determined by law and its interpretation. Freedom conceived in this way is indeed +protected, but at the same time confined within a precisely defined framework. A +person may move within this framework, but only to the extent that the structure of +the system allows. +This situation can be likened to a bird in a cage. The bird has room to move; it can +shift position, spread its wings, and even take flight, but always only within the limits +defined by the cage. Its freedom is real, but limited. The cage may be spacious, safe +and comfortable, yet it remains a cage. In the same way, the freedom guaranteed by +the system may be real, but not necessarily complete. +This image becomes particularly problematic when a bird has known no other +state of existence than life in a cage. In such a case, the boundary ceases to be +perceived as a restriction and becomes the natural framework of existence. Freedom +is then understood not as the possibility of flight, but as the possibility of movement +within the cage. +Modern society is often defined as a space of freedom. We have a wide range of +rights, choices and decisions at our disposal. We can choose our profession, opinions, +lifestyle or political views. However, these possibilities always exist within certain +structures (economic, legal and cultural) that determine which choices are actually +available. +The individual is encouraged to make decisions, but only within the limits of what +is considered acceptable, rational or legitimate. Anything that lies outside these +boundaries is labelled as unrealistic, dangerous or unacceptable. +In this context, the cage becomes invisible. It is not made up of physical bars, but +of norms, expectations and internally accepted constraints. A person may thus +consider themselves free without realising that the very scope of their freedom is +predetermined. The question of freedom is therefore not limited merely to whether we +can move, but rather to who determines the boundaries of that movement. +Is the freedom defined and guaranteed by the system truly freedom, or merely a +regulated form of it? + + +## 2 Homo est creatura indeterminata + +Johann Amos Comenius’s quote _“Homo est creatura indeterminata, quae in +infinito infinite seipsam_ agens”^1 expresses the concept of man as a being who is neither +pre-formed nor definitively determined. Here, the human being is understood as an open +process of constant self-creation. It is precisely this incompleteness of human +existence that constitutes one of the fundamental prerequisites of freedom. +However, the indeterminacy of the human being is often perceived as a problem. +Society seeks to overcome it through clear definitions of roles, rules and expectations, +which are intended to make human behaviour predictable and controllable. People are +categorised as citizens, workers, students, consumers; each of these roles carries with +it a set of implicit and explicit obligations. In this way, an indeterminate being +gradually becomes a determined being. +Such a definition, however, runs counter to the very essence of humanity. If +human existence is, at its core, fluid and open-ended, then any attempt to define it +definitively is bound to fail. Human beings are constantly evolving over time, in +response to their experiences and in their relationships with others. Freedom here +does not lie in the possibility of choosing between pre-determined options, but in the +possibility of creating, changing or rejecting these options. +Comenius’s conception of the human being as a creature acting ‘infinitely in the +infinite’ also points to the creative dimension of human existence. The human being +is not merely a performer of prescribed roles, but an active creator of their own life. +This creative aspect, however, is incompatible with rigid structures that presuppose +stability, repeatability and obedience. +This tension gives rise to a fundamental contradiction between the individual and +the system. Whilst the individual is dynamic and changeable, the system must +necessarily be static in order to function. The more the system attempts to ‘liberate’ +the individual through rigidly defined rules, the more it risks suppressing precisely +that indeterminacy which makes freedom possible. +Human freedom is thus not a state that can be attained once and then maintained. +It is a process of constant decision-making, re-evaluation and transcending one’s own +limits. As _a creatura indeterminata_ , the human being cannot be truly free within a +definitively closed order, since their very essence lies in openness to change. +This reality poses a fundamental question to modern society: is it even possible to +create a system that would respect the indeterminacy of human existence without +simultaneously restricting it? + + +## 3 Systema ut cavea + +Systems that provide a structured framework for human society do not arise by +chance. They are a response to the uncertainty, chaos and unpredictability of +human behaviour. Their aim is to create an order that enables coexistence, +protection and stability. In this sense, systems are not inherently evil; on the contrary, +they often arise from emancipatory efforts and the need to ensure the basic +conditions for human dignity. +The problem, however, arises when the system begins to be regarded as an +indispensable and immutable framework of human existence. In order to fulfil its +function, it must reduce the complexity of reality to a set of rules, categories and +processes. Human beings thus become objects of administration, not of action. What +was originally a means of protecting freedom gradually transforms into an instrument +of its regulation. +As mentioned in Section 1, an important feature of this cage is its invisibility. +Unlike a physical prison, its bars are not obvious. They are formed by legal norms, +economic necessities and social expectations, which the individual gradually +internalises. People are thus often guided not only by external rules, but also by their +own ideas of what is ‘right’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘possible’. The cage shifts from the +external world to the individual’s inner self. +Moreover, the system is incapable of reflecting the individual’s inherent +uncertainty, as discussed by Comenius. To remain functional, it requires stability and +predictability. The more complex society becomes, the more rules it requires, and the +less room it leaves for deviation. Freedom thus becomes the exception, not the norm, +and must be constantly justified. +The crucial moment is when the system begins to protect itself from itself. Instead +of serving people, it begins to serve its own reproduction. Criticism of the system is +perceived as a threat to order, not as an effort to improve it. At this point, the cage +closes: not because the space has shrunk, but because the possibility of questioning it +has vanished. +_Systema ut cavea_ thus does not label the system as an absolute evil, but rather as a +structure which, by its very nature, comes into conflict with the indeterminate and +dynamic essence of the human being. The freedom that is possible within such a +system is always a conditional freedom. It is the freedom of movement within the +cage, not the freedom of flight. +This fact leads us to question the assumption that freedom can be enshrined +once and for all in an institutional form. If a system becomes the ultimate +guarantor of freedom, it ceases to be open to change and gradually becomes an +obstacle to human emancipation. This raises the question of the temporal limitations of +any social order. + + +## 4 Transitorietas omnis ordinis + +Every social order arises within a specific historical context as a response to the +concrete problems of its time. What is perceived as liberating and necessary at one +moment may, at another time, appear restrictive and dysfunctional. No system can +therefore be regarded as universal or timeless; its validity is always contingent upon +the circumstances from which it arose. +The history of human societies shows that systems often arise as a reaction to +oppression or chaos. Revolutionary ideas promising equality and freedom are +gradually institutionalised so that they can be maintained and administered. Once +liberating principles become a fixed structure, they begin to restrict the very dynamics +from which they originally arose. +The transition from emancipation to restriction is not sudden, but gradual. The +rules that were meant to protect us are multiplying and becoming more precise. +Exceptions are gradually being eliminated, and deviations are seen as a threat to +stability. The system that once served humanity is beginning to demand that humanity +adapt to it. Freedom thus becomes a privilege that must be defended within the +framework of the existing order. +A fundamental feature of this development is the system’s inability to reflect on +its own finitude. Every order presupposes its own permanence, for its legitimacy is +closely linked to this assumption. To acknowledge its transience would be to +acknowledge its own imperfection. Therefore, the system resists change, even when +its original function has been exhausted. What was meant to be a means becomes an +obstacle. +At this stage, the system ceases to be an instrument of human emancipation and +begins to function as a mechanism of conservation. It no longer safeguards freedom, but +the stability of the order itself. _Transitorietas omnis ordinis_ thus denotes not only the +factual mutability of social systems, but also their internal contradiction. An order +that seeks to deny its own transience inevitably fails in relation to the human being +as _creatura indeterminata_. Freedom that is bound to an unchanging system +becomes historically exhausted and gradually loses its emancipatory potential. +Recognising this transience leads to a fundamental question: if no order can be the +definitive guarantor of freedom, who or what decides on it at any given moment? + + +## 5 Quis de libertate mea constituit? + +If no social order can be a permanent guarantor of freedom, the question arises as to +who or what actually determines an individual’s freedom at any given moment. At +first glance, the answer seems obvious: it is the institutions, laws and authorities that +formally define the boundaries of what is permitted and what is forbidden. However, +this answer is only partial. +Visible power manifests itself through the state, the legal system and its +enforcement mechanisms. The law defines the framework for conduct and sets out +penalties for transgressing it. In this sense, freedom is always conditional: it exists +only to the extent that it does not conflict with the prevailing order. Freedom +conceived in this way is comprehensible, yet limited, as it presupposes that the +legitimacy of decision-making lies outside the individual. +Added to these external factors are social norms and expectations, which +determine what is considered acceptable, successful or desirable. The individual +conforms to them not only out of fear of sanctions, but also out of a need for +recognition and a sense of belonging. Freedom is thus regulated not only from above, +but also horizontally, through relationships between people. +The internalisation of power plays a fundamental role in this process. People +gradually internalise the rules of the system to such an extent that they cease to +perceive them as external constraints. The decisions they make appear to them to be +free, even though they are shaped by structures that were not of their own choosing. +At this point, the question of power shifts from the realm of external control to that of +self-control. +However, one must not overlook the individual’s own participation in this +arrangement. Accepting the system, resigning oneself to not questioning it, and +exchanging autonomy for comfort represent active, albeit often unconscious, +decisions. Freedom is not merely restricted, but also voluntarily relinquished, +particularly when it entails uncertainty and responsibility. +The question “who decides on my freedom” therefore has no clear-cut answer. +Decision-making is dispersed amongst institutions, economic structures, social +relations and the individual themselves. It is precisely this dispersion that makes +freedom difficult to grasp and, at the same time, vulnerable. +If freedom is to have meaning in the context of the human being as _a creatura +indeterminata_ , it cannot be understood merely as something decided by others. +This gives rise to the need to turn the question in a different direction: not who +decides on my freedom, but how I can participate in this decision-making. + + +## 6 Quomodo de libertate mea decernam? + +The question of freedom cannot be confined merely to an analysis of external +structures and mechanisms of power. If a human being is truly an indeterminate and +open being, then freedom is not something decided solely outside them, but +something in which they must actively participate. Deciding on one’s own freedom +thus does not take place as a one-off event, but as an ongoing process. +A fundamental prerequisite for this process is the acceptance of responsibility. +Freedom that is not linked to responsibility is easily reduced to a mere possibility of +choice without consequences. Such freedom is comfortable, yet superficial. True +freedom, on the other hand, involves an awareness of the consequences of one’s own +actions, uncertainty and the risk of error. To decide freely means accepting the +possibility that the chosen course of action will not be successful or socially +approved. +However, deciding on one’s own freedom cannot be understood as a purely +individual act. A person does not exist in isolation, but always in relation to others. +One person’s freedom is realised in a space shared with others and is inseparably +linked to the freedom of others. If freedom is to be more than merely a privilege of +the powerful, it must be based on reciprocity and solidarity. +In this sense, freedom cannot be equated with the absence of all constraints. It is +rather a rejection of hierarchical relationships in which decision-making is +concentrated in the hands of a few actors, whilst others are reduced to mere executors +of someone else’s will. Decision-making regarding freedom is then shifted from a +central authority to horizontal relationships between individuals. +Deciding on one’s own freedom does not, therefore, mean rejecting all order, but +rather rejecting its absolutisation. It means being prepared to participate in shaping +rules that are not imposed from above, but arise from shared experience and needs. +Freedom here is not a goal that can be attained, but a way of being that must be +constantly reaffirmed. +This brings us full circle, back to the metaphor of the bird in a cage. If the cage is +truly to be opened, it is not enough to remove its bars. It is necessary to change the +very relationship of the individual to the space in which they move and to the people +with whom they share it. + + +## 7 Conclusion: Carcere aperto? + +This essay drew on the metaphor of a bird in a cage as an image of freedom that is +made possible, yet at the same time defined. The freedoms guaranteed by modern +society were understood as formally secured, yet necessarily limited by the +framework of the system that defines them. It was already evident in the introduction +that freedom which is fully defined by a legal or institutional order remains a +conditional freedom. +Comenius’s conception of man as _a creatura indeterminata_^1 provided the +philosophical basis for this critique. As an unfinished, changeable being open to +transformation, man cannot be fully grasped by a static system. Any attempt to +definitively define human existence thus inevitably comes up against the +contradiction between the living reality of man and the system’s need for stability +and predictability. +In Chapter 3, _‘Systema ut cavea’_ , the system was described as a structure which, +by its very nature, comes into conflict with freedom. Systems arise from +emancipatory endeavours, yet their inherent tendency towards self-preservation +gradually leads to a narrowing of the space in which human freedom can truly be +realised. This contradiction deepens over time, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, +_Transitorietas omnis ordinis_. Every order is historically conditioned and temporary. +The question of freedom could not, therefore, be confined merely to a critique of +external power. The chapters devoted to deliberations on freedom have shown that +freedom is simultaneously restricted and relinquished through the internalisation of +rules, complacency and a resignation from responsibility. Freedom is not merely +suppressed, but often delegated — to institutions, authorities and abstract systems that +promise stability in exchange for obedience. +This leads to the political-philosophical conclusion of this work: freedom cannot +be definitively guaranteed by any central authority or hierarchical structure. If +freedom is to be compatible with the indeterminate nature of humanity, it must be +understood as a process of jointly shaping the conditions of existence, based on +responsibility, solidarity and the rejection of domination. The freedom of one person +is not here in opposition to the freedom of another, but rather its prerequisite. +Freedom, therefore, does not begin with the removal of all boundaries, but with +the questioning of their absoluteness. It is not a state that can be attained once and for +all, but a ceaseless movement in which a person, together with others, transcends the +orders that have ceased to liberate them. In this sense, the freedom of a bird in a cage +is not true freedom — true freedom begins only when flight is possible once more. + + +## Bibliography + +[ 1 ] Jan Čížek. “The Philosophical-Theological Concept of Man in Comenius’s +Consultatio Catholica”. In: _Studia Comeniana et historica_ 44.91– 92 (2014), +pp. 31 – 64. URL: https://www.academia.edu/17809032/ The Philosophical and +Theological Concept of Man in Comenius’s Consultatio Catholica. + +[ 2 ] _Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Constitutional Act No. 2/1993 Coll._ Prague, +1993. + + + -- cgit v1.2.3