# Libertas hominis est sicut libertas avis in cavea

## Human freedom is like the freedom of a bird in a cage.

### Natasha Moongrave
### January 2026

## 1 Introduction: Avis in cavea

According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech
Republic, freedom, or rather individual freedoms, is defined as “inalienable,
inalienable, imprescriptible and irrevocable”^2. Freedom is presented here as a
fundamental characteristic of human existence, which belongs to every person
regardless of circumstances. The question is whether it is actually possible to
guarantee freedom through a legal text.
Freedom then becomes a set of defined rights, the boundaries of which are
determined by law and its interpretation. Freedom conceived in this way is indeed
protected, but at the same time confined within a precisely defined framework. A
person may move within this framework, but only to the extent that the structure of
the system allows.
This situation can be likened to a bird in a cage. The bird has room to move; it can
shift position, spread its wings, and even take flight, but always only within the limits
defined by the cage. Its freedom is real, but limited. The cage may be spacious, safe
and comfortable, yet it remains a cage. In the same way, the freedom guaranteed by
the system may be real, but not necessarily complete.
This image becomes particularly problematic when a bird has known no other
state of existence than life in a cage. In such a case, the boundary ceases to be
perceived as a restriction and becomes the natural framework of existence. Freedom
is then understood not as the possibility of flight, but as the possibility of movement
within the cage.
Modern society is often defined as a space of freedom. We have a wide range of
rights, choices and decisions at our disposal. We can choose our profession, opinions,
lifestyle or political views. However, these possibilities always exist within certain
structures (economic, legal and cultural) that determine which choices are actually
available.
The individual is encouraged to make decisions, but only within the limits of what
is considered acceptable, rational or legitimate. Anything that lies outside these
boundaries is labelled as unrealistic, dangerous or unacceptable.
In this context, the cage becomes invisible. It is not made up of physical bars, but
of norms, expectations and internally accepted constraints. A person may thus
consider themselves free without realising that the very scope of their freedom is
predetermined. The question of freedom is therefore not limited merely to whether we
can move, but rather to who determines the boundaries of that movement.
Is the freedom defined and guaranteed by the system truly freedom, or merely a
regulated form of it?


## 2 Homo est creatura indeterminata

Johann Amos Comenius’s quote _“Homo est creatura indeterminata, quae in
infinito infinite seipsam_ agens”^1 expresses the concept of man as a being who is neither
pre-formed nor definitively determined. Here, the human being is understood as an open
process of constant self-creation. It is precisely this incompleteness of human
existence that constitutes one of the fundamental prerequisites of freedom.
However, the indeterminacy of the human being is often perceived as a problem.
Society seeks to overcome it through clear definitions of roles, rules and expectations,
which are intended to make human behaviour predictable and controllable. People are
categorised as citizens, workers, students, consumers; each of these roles carries with
it a set of implicit and explicit obligations. In this way, an indeterminate being
gradually becomes a determined being.
Such a definition, however, runs counter to the very essence of humanity. If
human existence is, at its core, fluid and open-ended, then any attempt to define it
definitively is bound to fail. Human beings are constantly evolving over time, in
response to their experiences and in their relationships with others. Freedom here
does not lie in the possibility of choosing between pre-determined options, but in the
possibility of creating, changing or rejecting these options.
Comenius’s conception of the human being as a creature acting ‘infinitely in the
infinite’ also points to the creative dimension of human existence. The human being
is not merely a performer of prescribed roles, but an active creator of their own life.
This creative aspect, however, is incompatible with rigid structures that presuppose
stability, repeatability and obedience.
This tension gives rise to a fundamental contradiction between the individual and
the system. Whilst the individual is dynamic and changeable, the system must
necessarily be static in order to function. The more the system attempts to ‘liberate’
the individual through rigidly defined rules, the more it risks suppressing precisely
that indeterminacy which makes freedom possible.
Human freedom is thus not a state that can be attained once and then maintained.
It is a process of constant decision-making, re-evaluation and transcending one’s own
limits. As _a creatura indeterminata_ , the human being cannot be truly free within a
definitively closed order, since their very essence lies in openness to change.
This reality poses a fundamental question to modern society: is it even possible to
create a system that would respect the indeterminacy of human existence without
simultaneously restricting it?


## 3 Systema ut cavea

Systems that provide a structured framework for human society do not arise by
chance. They are a response to the uncertainty, chaos and unpredictability of
human behaviour. Their aim is to create an order that enables coexistence,
protection and stability. In this sense, systems are not inherently evil; on the contrary,
they often arise from emancipatory efforts and the need to ensure the basic
conditions for human dignity.
The problem, however, arises when the system begins to be regarded as an
indispensable and immutable framework of human existence. In order to fulfil its
function, it must reduce the complexity of reality to a set of rules, categories and
processes. Human beings thus become objects of administration, not of action. What
was originally a means of protecting freedom gradually transforms into an instrument
of its regulation.
As mentioned in Section 1, an important feature of this cage is its invisibility.
Unlike a physical prison, its bars are not obvious. They are formed by legal norms,
economic necessities and social expectations, which the individual gradually
internalises. People are thus often guided not only by external rules, but also by their
own ideas of what is ‘right’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘possible’. The cage shifts from the
external world to the individual’s inner self.
Moreover, the system is incapable of reflecting the individual’s inherent
uncertainty, as discussed by Comenius. To remain functional, it requires stability and
predictability. The more complex society becomes, the more rules it requires, and the
less room it leaves for deviation. Freedom thus becomes the exception, not the norm,
and must be constantly justified.
The crucial moment is when the system begins to protect itself from itself. Instead
of serving people, it begins to serve its own reproduction. Criticism of the system is
perceived as a threat to order, not as an effort to improve it. At this point, the cage
closes: not because the space has shrunk, but because the possibility of questioning it
has vanished.
_Systema ut cavea_ thus does not label the system as an absolute evil, but rather as a
structure which, by its very nature, comes into conflict with the indeterminate and
dynamic essence of the human being. The freedom that is possible within such a
system is always a conditional freedom. It is the freedom of movement within the
cage, not the freedom of flight.
This fact leads us to question the assumption that freedom can be enshrined
once and for all in an institutional form. If a system becomes the ultimate
guarantor of freedom, it ceases to be open to change and gradually becomes an
obstacle to human emancipation. This raises the question of the temporal limitations of
any social order.


## 4 Transitorietas omnis ordinis

Every social order arises within a specific historical context as a response to the
concrete problems of its time. What is perceived as liberating and necessary at one
moment may, at another time, appear restrictive and dysfunctional. No system can
therefore be regarded as universal or timeless; its validity is always contingent upon
the circumstances from which it arose.
The history of human societies shows that systems often arise as a reaction to
oppression or chaos. Revolutionary ideas promising equality and freedom are
gradually institutionalised so that they can be maintained and administered. Once
liberating principles become a fixed structure, they begin to restrict the very dynamics
from which they originally arose.
The transition from emancipation to restriction is not sudden, but gradual. The
rules that were meant to protect us are multiplying and becoming more precise.
Exceptions are gradually being eliminated, and deviations are seen as a threat to
stability. The system that once served humanity is beginning to demand that humanity
adapt to it. Freedom thus becomes a privilege that must be defended within the
framework of the existing order.
A fundamental feature of this development is the system’s inability to reflect on
its own finitude. Every order presupposes its own permanence, for its legitimacy is
closely linked to this assumption. To acknowledge its transience would be to
acknowledge its own imperfection. Therefore, the system resists change, even when
its original function has been exhausted. What was meant to be a means becomes an
obstacle.
At this stage, the system ceases to be an instrument of human emancipation and
begins to function as a mechanism of conservation. It no longer safeguards freedom, but
the stability of the order itself. _Transitorietas omnis ordinis_ thus denotes not only the
factual mutability of social systems, but also their internal contradiction. An order
that seeks to deny its own transience inevitably fails in relation to the human being
as _creatura indeterminata_. Freedom that is bound to an unchanging system
becomes historically exhausted and gradually loses its emancipatory potential.
Recognising this transience leads to a fundamental question: if no order can be the
definitive guarantor of freedom, who or what decides on it at any given moment?


## 5 Quis de libertate mea constituit?

If no social order can be a permanent guarantor of freedom, the question arises as to
who or what actually determines an individual’s freedom at any given moment. At
first glance, the answer seems obvious: it is the institutions, laws and authorities that
formally define the boundaries of what is permitted and what is forbidden. However,
this answer is only partial.
Visible power manifests itself through the state, the legal system and its
enforcement mechanisms. The law defines the framework for conduct and sets out
penalties for transgressing it. In this sense, freedom is always conditional: it exists
only to the extent that it does not conflict with the prevailing order. Freedom
conceived in this way is comprehensible, yet limited, as it presupposes that the
legitimacy of decision-making lies outside the individual.
Added to these external factors are social norms and expectations, which
determine what is considered acceptable, successful or desirable. The individual
conforms to them not only out of fear of sanctions, but also out of a need for
recognition and a sense of belonging. Freedom is thus regulated not only from above,
but also horizontally, through relationships between people.
The internalisation of power plays a fundamental role in this process. People
gradually internalise the rules of the system to such an extent that they cease to
perceive them as external constraints. The decisions they make appear to them to be
free, even though they are shaped by structures that were not of their own choosing.
At this point, the question of power shifts from the realm of external control to that of
self-control.
However, one must not overlook the individual’s own participation in this
arrangement. Accepting the system, resigning oneself to not questioning it, and
exchanging autonomy for comfort represent active, albeit often unconscious,
decisions. Freedom is not merely restricted, but also voluntarily relinquished,
particularly when it entails uncertainty and responsibility.
The question “who decides on my freedom” therefore has no clear-cut answer.
Decision-making is dispersed amongst institutions, economic structures, social
relations and the individual themselves. It is precisely this dispersion that makes
freedom difficult to grasp and, at the same time, vulnerable.
If freedom is to have meaning in the context of the human being as _a creatura
indeterminata_ , it cannot be understood merely as something decided by others.
This gives rise to the need to turn the question in a different direction: not who
decides on my freedom, but how I can participate in this decision-making.


## 6 Quomodo de libertate mea decernam?

The question of freedom cannot be confined merely to an analysis of external
structures and mechanisms of power. If a human being is truly an indeterminate and
open being, then freedom is not something decided solely outside them, but
something in which they must actively participate. Deciding on one’s own freedom
thus does not take place as a one-off event, but as an ongoing process.
A fundamental prerequisite for this process is the acceptance of responsibility.
Freedom that is not linked to responsibility is easily reduced to a mere possibility of
choice without consequences. Such freedom is comfortable, yet superficial. True
freedom, on the other hand, involves an awareness of the consequences of one’s own
actions, uncertainty and the risk of error. To decide freely means accepting the
possibility that the chosen course of action will not be successful or socially
approved.
However, deciding on one’s own freedom cannot be understood as a purely
individual act. A person does not exist in isolation, but always in relation to others.
One person’s freedom is realised in a space shared with others and is inseparably
linked to the freedom of others. If freedom is to be more than merely a privilege of
the powerful, it must be based on reciprocity and solidarity.
In this sense, freedom cannot be equated with the absence of all constraints. It is
rather a rejection of hierarchical relationships in which decision-making is
concentrated in the hands of a few actors, whilst others are reduced to mere executors
of someone else’s will. Decision-making regarding freedom is then shifted from a
central authority to horizontal relationships between individuals.
Deciding on one’s own freedom does not, therefore, mean rejecting all order, but
rather rejecting its absolutisation. It means being prepared to participate in shaping
rules that are not imposed from above, but arise from shared experience and needs.
Freedom here is not a goal that can be attained, but a way of being that must be
constantly reaffirmed.
This brings us full circle, back to the metaphor of the bird in a cage. If the cage is
truly to be opened, it is not enough to remove its bars. It is necessary to change the
very relationship of the individual to the space in which they move and to the people
with whom they share it.


## 7 Conclusion: Carcere aperto?

This essay drew on the metaphor of a bird in a cage as an image of freedom that is
made possible, yet at the same time defined. The freedoms guaranteed by modern
society were understood as formally secured, yet necessarily limited by the
framework of the system that defines them. It was already evident in the introduction
that freedom which is fully defined by a legal or institutional order remains a
conditional freedom.
Comenius’s conception of man as _a creatura indeterminata_^1 provided the
philosophical basis for this critique. As an unfinished, changeable being open to
transformation, man cannot be fully grasped by a static system. Any attempt to
definitively define human existence thus inevitably comes up against the
contradiction between the living reality of man and the system’s need for stability
and predictability.
In Chapter 3, _‘Systema ut cavea’_ , the system was described as a structure which,
by its very nature, comes into conflict with freedom. Systems arise from
emancipatory endeavours, yet their inherent tendency towards self-preservation
gradually leads to a narrowing of the space in which human freedom can truly be
realised. This contradiction deepens over time, as demonstrated in Chapter 4,
_Transitorietas omnis ordinis_. Every order is historically conditioned and temporary.
The question of freedom could not, therefore, be confined merely to a critique of
external power. The chapters devoted to deliberations on freedom have shown that
freedom is simultaneously restricted and relinquished through the internalisation of
rules, complacency and a resignation from responsibility. Freedom is not merely
suppressed, but often delegated — to institutions, authorities and abstract systems that
promise stability in exchange for obedience.
This leads to the political-philosophical conclusion of this work: freedom cannot
be definitively guaranteed by any central authority or hierarchical structure. If
freedom is to be compatible with the indeterminate nature of humanity, it must be
understood as a process of jointly shaping the conditions of existence, based on
responsibility, solidarity and the rejection of domination. The freedom of one person
is not here in opposition to the freedom of another, but rather its prerequisite.
Freedom, therefore, does not begin with the removal of all boundaries, but with
the questioning of their absoluteness. It is not a state that can be attained once and for
all, but a ceaseless movement in which a person, together with others, transcends the
orders that have ceased to liberate them. In this sense, the freedom of a bird in a cage
is not true freedom — true freedom begins only when flight is possible once more.


## Bibliography

[ 1 ] Jan Čížek. “The Philosophical-Theological Concept of Man in Comenius’s
Consultatio Catholica”. In: _Studia Comeniana et historica_ 44.91– 92 (2014),
pp. 31 – 64. URL: https://www.academia.edu/17809032/ The Philosophical and
Theological Concept of Man in Comenius’s Consultatio Catholica.

[ 2 ] _Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Constitutional Act No. 2/1993 Coll._ Prague,
1993.