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+# Libertas hominis est sicut libertas avis in cavea
+
+## Human freedom is like the freedom of a bird in a cage.
+
+### Natasha Moongrave
+### January 2026
+
+## 1 Introduction: Avis in cavea
+
+According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech
+Republic, freedom, or rather individual freedoms, is defined as “inalienable,
+inalienable, imprescriptible and irrevocable”^2. Freedom is presented here as a
+fundamental characteristic of human existence, which belongs to every person
+regardless of circumstances. The question is whether it is actually possible to
+guarantee freedom through a legal text.
+Freedom then becomes a set of defined rights, the boundaries of which are
+determined by law and its interpretation. Freedom conceived in this way is indeed
+protected, but at the same time confined within a precisely defined framework. A
+person may move within this framework, but only to the extent that the structure of
+the system allows.
+This situation can be likened to a bird in a cage. The bird has room to move; it can
+shift position, spread its wings, and even take flight, but always only within the limits
+defined by the cage. Its freedom is real, but limited. The cage may be spacious, safe
+and comfortable, yet it remains a cage. In the same way, the freedom guaranteed by
+the system may be real, but not necessarily complete.
+This image becomes particularly problematic when a bird has known no other
+state of existence than life in a cage. In such a case, the boundary ceases to be
+perceived as a restriction and becomes the natural framework of existence. Freedom
+is then understood not as the possibility of flight, but as the possibility of movement
+within the cage.
+Modern society is often defined as a space of freedom. We have a wide range of
+rights, choices and decisions at our disposal. We can choose our profession, opinions,
+lifestyle or political views. However, these possibilities always exist within certain
+structures (economic, legal and cultural) that determine which choices are actually
+available.
+The individual is encouraged to make decisions, but only within the limits of what
+is considered acceptable, rational or legitimate. Anything that lies outside these
+boundaries is labelled as unrealistic, dangerous or unacceptable.
+In this context, the cage becomes invisible. It is not made up of physical bars, but
+of norms, expectations and internally accepted constraints. A person may thus
+consider themselves free without realising that the very scope of their freedom is
+predetermined. The question of freedom is therefore not limited merely to whether we
+can move, but rather to who determines the boundaries of that movement.
+Is the freedom defined and guaranteed by the system truly freedom, or merely a
+regulated form of it?
+
+
+## 2 Homo est creatura indeterminata
+
+Johann Amos Comenius’s quote _“Homo est creatura indeterminata, quae in
+infinito infinite seipsam_ agens”^1 expresses the concept of man as a being who is neither
+pre-formed nor definitively determined. Here, the human being is understood as an open
+process of constant self-creation. It is precisely this incompleteness of human
+existence that constitutes one of the fundamental prerequisites of freedom.
+However, the indeterminacy of the human being is often perceived as a problem.
+Society seeks to overcome it through clear definitions of roles, rules and expectations,
+which are intended to make human behaviour predictable and controllable. People are
+categorised as citizens, workers, students, consumers; each of these roles carries with
+it a set of implicit and explicit obligations. In this way, an indeterminate being
+gradually becomes a determined being.
+Such a definition, however, runs counter to the very essence of humanity. If
+human existence is, at its core, fluid and open-ended, then any attempt to define it
+definitively is bound to fail. Human beings are constantly evolving over time, in
+response to their experiences and in their relationships with others. Freedom here
+does not lie in the possibility of choosing between pre-determined options, but in the
+possibility of creating, changing or rejecting these options.
+Comenius’s conception of the human being as a creature acting ‘infinitely in the
+infinite’ also points to the creative dimension of human existence. The human being
+is not merely a performer of prescribed roles, but an active creator of their own life.
+This creative aspect, however, is incompatible with rigid structures that presuppose
+stability, repeatability and obedience.
+This tension gives rise to a fundamental contradiction between the individual and
+the system. Whilst the individual is dynamic and changeable, the system must
+necessarily be static in order to function. The more the system attempts to ‘liberate’
+the individual through rigidly defined rules, the more it risks suppressing precisely
+that indeterminacy which makes freedom possible.
+Human freedom is thus not a state that can be attained once and then maintained.
+It is a process of constant decision-making, re-evaluation and transcending one’s own
+limits. As _a creatura indeterminata_ , the human being cannot be truly free within a
+definitively closed order, since their very essence lies in openness to change.
+This reality poses a fundamental question to modern society: is it even possible to
+create a system that would respect the indeterminacy of human existence without
+simultaneously restricting it?
+
+
+## 3 Systema ut cavea
+
+Systems that provide a structured framework for human society do not arise by
+chance. They are a response to the uncertainty, chaos and unpredictability of
+human behaviour. Their aim is to create an order that enables coexistence,
+protection and stability. In this sense, systems are not inherently evil; on the contrary,
+they often arise from emancipatory efforts and the need to ensure the basic
+conditions for human dignity.
+The problem, however, arises when the system begins to be regarded as an
+indispensable and immutable framework of human existence. In order to fulfil its
+function, it must reduce the complexity of reality to a set of rules, categories and
+processes. Human beings thus become objects of administration, not of action. What
+was originally a means of protecting freedom gradually transforms into an instrument
+of its regulation.
+As mentioned in Section 1, an important feature of this cage is its invisibility.
+Unlike a physical prison, its bars are not obvious. They are formed by legal norms,
+economic necessities and social expectations, which the individual gradually
+internalises. People are thus often guided not only by external rules, but also by their
+own ideas of what is ‘right’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘possible’. The cage shifts from the
+external world to the individual’s inner self.
+Moreover, the system is incapable of reflecting the individual’s inherent
+uncertainty, as discussed by Comenius. To remain functional, it requires stability and
+predictability. The more complex society becomes, the more rules it requires, and the
+less room it leaves for deviation. Freedom thus becomes the exception, not the norm,
+and must be constantly justified.
+The crucial moment is when the system begins to protect itself from itself. Instead
+of serving people, it begins to serve its own reproduction. Criticism of the system is
+perceived as a threat to order, not as an effort to improve it. At this point, the cage
+closes: not because the space has shrunk, but because the possibility of questioning it
+has vanished.
+_Systema ut cavea_ thus does not label the system as an absolute evil, but rather as a
+structure which, by its very nature, comes into conflict with the indeterminate and
+dynamic essence of the human being. The freedom that is possible within such a
+system is always a conditional freedom. It is the freedom of movement within the
+cage, not the freedom of flight.
+This fact leads us to question the assumption that freedom can be enshrined
+once and for all in an institutional form. If a system becomes the ultimate
+guarantor of freedom, it ceases to be open to change and gradually becomes an
+obstacle to human emancipation. This raises the question of the temporal limitations of
+any social order.
+
+
+## 4 Transitorietas omnis ordinis
+
+Every social order arises within a specific historical context as a response to the
+concrete problems of its time. What is perceived as liberating and necessary at one
+moment may, at another time, appear restrictive and dysfunctional. No system can
+therefore be regarded as universal or timeless; its validity is always contingent upon
+the circumstances from which it arose.
+The history of human societies shows that systems often arise as a reaction to
+oppression or chaos. Revolutionary ideas promising equality and freedom are
+gradually institutionalised so that they can be maintained and administered. Once
+liberating principles become a fixed structure, they begin to restrict the very dynamics
+from which they originally arose.
+The transition from emancipation to restriction is not sudden, but gradual. The
+rules that were meant to protect us are multiplying and becoming more precise.
+Exceptions are gradually being eliminated, and deviations are seen as a threat to
+stability. The system that once served humanity is beginning to demand that humanity
+adapt to it. Freedom thus becomes a privilege that must be defended within the
+framework of the existing order.
+A fundamental feature of this development is the system’s inability to reflect on
+its own finitude. Every order presupposes its own permanence, for its legitimacy is
+closely linked to this assumption. To acknowledge its transience would be to
+acknowledge its own imperfection. Therefore, the system resists change, even when
+its original function has been exhausted. What was meant to be a means becomes an
+obstacle.
+At this stage, the system ceases to be an instrument of human emancipation and
+begins to function as a mechanism of conservation. It no longer safeguards freedom, but
+the stability of the order itself. _Transitorietas omnis ordinis_ thus denotes not only the
+factual mutability of social systems, but also their internal contradiction. An order
+that seeks to deny its own transience inevitably fails in relation to the human being
+as _creatura indeterminata_. Freedom that is bound to an unchanging system
+becomes historically exhausted and gradually loses its emancipatory potential.
+Recognising this transience leads to a fundamental question: if no order can be the
+definitive guarantor of freedom, who or what decides on it at any given moment?
+
+
+## 5 Quis de libertate mea constituit?
+
+If no social order can be a permanent guarantor of freedom, the question arises as to
+who or what actually determines an individual’s freedom at any given moment. At
+first glance, the answer seems obvious: it is the institutions, laws and authorities that
+formally define the boundaries of what is permitted and what is forbidden. However,
+this answer is only partial.
+Visible power manifests itself through the state, the legal system and its
+enforcement mechanisms. The law defines the framework for conduct and sets out
+penalties for transgressing it. In this sense, freedom is always conditional: it exists
+only to the extent that it does not conflict with the prevailing order. Freedom
+conceived in this way is comprehensible, yet limited, as it presupposes that the
+legitimacy of decision-making lies outside the individual.
+Added to these external factors are social norms and expectations, which
+determine what is considered acceptable, successful or desirable. The individual
+conforms to them not only out of fear of sanctions, but also out of a need for
+recognition and a sense of belonging. Freedom is thus regulated not only from above,
+but also horizontally, through relationships between people.
+The internalisation of power plays a fundamental role in this process. People
+gradually internalise the rules of the system to such an extent that they cease to
+perceive them as external constraints. The decisions they make appear to them to be
+free, even though they are shaped by structures that were not of their own choosing.
+At this point, the question of power shifts from the realm of external control to that of
+self-control.
+However, one must not overlook the individual’s own participation in this
+arrangement. Accepting the system, resigning oneself to not questioning it, and
+exchanging autonomy for comfort represent active, albeit often unconscious,
+decisions. Freedom is not merely restricted, but also voluntarily relinquished,
+particularly when it entails uncertainty and responsibility.
+The question “who decides on my freedom” therefore has no clear-cut answer.
+Decision-making is dispersed amongst institutions, economic structures, social
+relations and the individual themselves. It is precisely this dispersion that makes
+freedom difficult to grasp and, at the same time, vulnerable.
+If freedom is to have meaning in the context of the human being as _a creatura
+indeterminata_ , it cannot be understood merely as something decided by others.
+This gives rise to the need to turn the question in a different direction: not who
+decides on my freedom, but how I can participate in this decision-making.
+
+
+## 6 Quomodo de libertate mea decernam?
+
+The question of freedom cannot be confined merely to an analysis of external
+structures and mechanisms of power. If a human being is truly an indeterminate and
+open being, then freedom is not something decided solely outside them, but
+something in which they must actively participate. Deciding on one’s own freedom
+thus does not take place as a one-off event, but as an ongoing process.
+A fundamental prerequisite for this process is the acceptance of responsibility.
+Freedom that is not linked to responsibility is easily reduced to a mere possibility of
+choice without consequences. Such freedom is comfortable, yet superficial. True
+freedom, on the other hand, involves an awareness of the consequences of one’s own
+actions, uncertainty and the risk of error. To decide freely means accepting the
+possibility that the chosen course of action will not be successful or socially
+approved.
+However, deciding on one’s own freedom cannot be understood as a purely
+individual act. A person does not exist in isolation, but always in relation to others.
+One person’s freedom is realised in a space shared with others and is inseparably
+linked to the freedom of others. If freedom is to be more than merely a privilege of
+the powerful, it must be based on reciprocity and solidarity.
+In this sense, freedom cannot be equated with the absence of all constraints. It is
+rather a rejection of hierarchical relationships in which decision-making is
+concentrated in the hands of a few actors, whilst others are reduced to mere executors
+of someone else’s will. Decision-making regarding freedom is then shifted from a
+central authority to horizontal relationships between individuals.
+Deciding on one’s own freedom does not, therefore, mean rejecting all order, but
+rather rejecting its absolutisation. It means being prepared to participate in shaping
+rules that are not imposed from above, but arise from shared experience and needs.
+Freedom here is not a goal that can be attained, but a way of being that must be
+constantly reaffirmed.
+This brings us full circle, back to the metaphor of the bird in a cage. If the cage is
+truly to be opened, it is not enough to remove its bars. It is necessary to change the
+very relationship of the individual to the space in which they move and to the people
+with whom they share it.
+
+
+## 7 Conclusion: Carcere aperto?
+
+This essay drew on the metaphor of a bird in a cage as an image of freedom that is
+made possible, yet at the same time defined. The freedoms guaranteed by modern
+society were understood as formally secured, yet necessarily limited by the
+framework of the system that defines them. It was already evident in the introduction
+that freedom which is fully defined by a legal or institutional order remains a
+conditional freedom.
+Comenius’s conception of man as _a creatura indeterminata_^1 provided the
+philosophical basis for this critique. As an unfinished, changeable being open to
+transformation, man cannot be fully grasped by a static system. Any attempt to
+definitively define human existence thus inevitably comes up against the
+contradiction between the living reality of man and the system’s need for stability
+and predictability.
+In Chapter 3, _‘Systema ut cavea’_ , the system was described as a structure which,
+by its very nature, comes into conflict with freedom. Systems arise from
+emancipatory endeavours, yet their inherent tendency towards self-preservation
+gradually leads to a narrowing of the space in which human freedom can truly be
+realised. This contradiction deepens over time, as demonstrated in Chapter 4,
+_Transitorietas omnis ordinis_. Every order is historically conditioned and temporary.
+The question of freedom could not, therefore, be confined merely to a critique of
+external power. The chapters devoted to deliberations on freedom have shown that
+freedom is simultaneously restricted and relinquished through the internalisation of
+rules, complacency and a resignation from responsibility. Freedom is not merely
+suppressed, but often delegated — to institutions, authorities and abstract systems that
+promise stability in exchange for obedience.
+This leads to the political-philosophical conclusion of this work: freedom cannot
+be definitively guaranteed by any central authority or hierarchical structure. If
+freedom is to be compatible with the indeterminate nature of humanity, it must be
+understood as a process of jointly shaping the conditions of existence, based on
+responsibility, solidarity and the rejection of domination. The freedom of one person
+is not here in opposition to the freedom of another, but rather its prerequisite.
+Freedom, therefore, does not begin with the removal of all boundaries, but with
+the questioning of their absoluteness. It is not a state that can be attained once and for
+all, but a ceaseless movement in which a person, together with others, transcends the
+orders that have ceased to liberate them. In this sense, the freedom of a bird in a cage
+is not true freedom — true freedom begins only when flight is possible once more.
+
+
+## Bibliography
+
+[ 1 ] Jan Čížek. “The Philosophical-Theological Concept of Man in Comenius’s
+Consultatio Catholica”. In: _Studia Comeniana et historica_ 44.91– 92 (2014),
+pp. 31 – 64. URL: https://www.academia.edu/17809032/ The Philosophical and
+Theological Concept of Man in Comenius’s Consultatio Catholica.
+
+[ 2 ] _Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Constitutional Act No. 2/1993 Coll._ Prague,
+1993.
+
+
+